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Abstract 
Phishing attacks have been on a meteoric rise in the last number of years, with 2016 seeing a 
65% increase. The attacks range from targeting individuals with personalised messages to spam 
attacks from bot accounts. With the chances of being targeted by a phishing attack increasing, 
it is important to identify who is most at risk in order to help alleviate this threat.  
The aim of this study is to examine members from several demographics and their vulnerability 
to three types of phishing using data collected from a survey (n = 198). The survey tested the 
participant’s ability to recognise spoofed phishing emails, SMS phishing (Smishing) and 
content spoofing attacks. The respondents were presented with questions in the form of 
screenshots using real world phishing examples. Their answers were collected which recorded 
whether they got each question correct or incorrect. The data collected was analysed using a 
two sample t-test or one-way Anova depending on the number of categories per demographic.  
This study addressed demographic vulnerability to different types of phishing and highlighted 
who is most at risk. The results of the research revealed that gender and income did not play a 
part in a participant’s vulnerability to phishing when analysing their total scores across each 
type of phishing. However, age, education and occupation presented statistically significant 
results to indicate they do.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
As technology advances, there is a greater reliance on the internet for people to conduct 
business and socialise. This advancement in technology has also resulted in 
cybercriminals following the trend as there is an increased risk of users being the target 
of fraud (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007). One of the main types of internet fraud is 
phishing which “is a form of social engineering attack in which phishers, i.e. attackers, 
trick the victim to fraudulently obtain private information” (Darwish, Zarka, & Aloul, 
2013). The information collected by these attacks “can be used in identity theft, to 
remove funds from a customer account, and in theft of online resources” (Wardman, 
2016). Phishing has been a growing problem for internet users and organisations as 
methods to deceive users and gain sensitive information have become more 
commonplace and sophisticated (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2017). Furthermore, 
the Anti-Phishing Working Group’s 2016 report observed that “2016 ended as the worst 
year for phishing in history with 1.2 million attacks, 65% more than 2015”. As phishing 
becomes more of a problem, the reasons why people fall victim to these exploits are 
examined. The psychology behind why the attacks succeed and who fall for them need 
to be further explored. 
As part of the initial research for this project, a survey study of twenty-three cyber 
security professionals was conducted. The survey examined whether anti-phishing 
training and education could prevent attacks against organisations. The results, as shown 
in Fig.1-1, found that 78% of the respondents believed phishing “is one of the most 
significant threats we face today.1” (Griffin, 2017). 
                                                 
1 This study was conducted in 2017 using Survey Monkey. The population was sourced through the 
author’s employer. It was sent to the cyber security and risk advisory department. 
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Figure 1-1: Responses to the current threat of phishing 
 
1.2 Research Problem  
This study will highlight the similarities between certain demographics and their 
vulnerability to three phishing categories. Researchers have studied why people fall for 
phishing attacks however; limited research has been done to study demographic factors 
in vulnerability to phishing. By determining which groups are most vulnerable to 
phishing, we can potentially outline the best course of action to prevent and protect 
against it. (Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010). 
The objective of this research project is to identify differences that exist among several 
demographics to determine which population group is more vulnerable to being 
exploited by a particular phishing category. There are many different types of phishing 
such as email, search engine, session hijacking, DNS-based and deceptive phishing. 
Although email is widely used, “phishing has spread beyond email to include VoIP, 
SMS, instant messaging, social networking sites, and even massively multiplayer 
games” (Hong, 2012). 
Three categories of phishing have been selected for this research project due to their 
recurring nature and potential to cause harm (Hong, 2012; Huang, Zhong, & Tan, 2009). 
These include: 
1. Email – Phishes sent via email 
78.26
21.74
0 0
How do you categorise phishing as a serious 
business threat to your organisation?
It is one of the most
significant threats we
face today
It is of some concern
but not a top cyber
security priority
It is not perceived as a
serious business threat
We have not
experienced spear
phishing attacks
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2. Smishing – SMS phishing where an attacker uses text messages to exploit 
victims. 
3. Content Spoofing – Altering some of the content of a reliable page to trick 
users. 
Five demographic groups were chosen in order to compare and contrast their 
vulnerability to the three phishing categories. The demographics chosen for this study 
are: 
1. Gender 
2. Age 
3. Education 
4. Income 
5. Occupation/Student 
 Research Questions 
To determine whether demographics have an influence on a person’s vulnerability to 
phishing, the research seeks to answer: 
RQ1: Are members of demographic groups more vulnerable to being exploited by a 
particular category of phishing attack?  
With the research question defined, several hypotheses were outlined which are to be 
investigated: 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between males 
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between males 
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between age 
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between age 
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
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Hypothesis 3: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between 
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
H3: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between 
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
Hypothesis 4: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between 
income levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
H4: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between income 
levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
Hypothesis 5: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between 
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
H5: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between 
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Most of the past work in the area of phishing has focused on why people fall for an 
attack, how to deal with detection, trends, and the economic impact. Little research has 
been carried out regarding what type of users are vulnerable to being phished 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009a; Sheng et al., 2010). After performing a thorough review of 
the relevant literature, it appears no study has been undertaken to determine what types 
of phishing are the most successful at exploiting these users.   
This research study is a quantitative evaluation of vulnerability among different types of 
phishing. Whether gender, age, education, income or occupation influences the user’s 
vulnerability to phishing is determined by this study. The objective of the research is to 
administer a scored survey to capture demographic information of a large and diverse 
population group. The survey will include questions relating to three phishing categories 
that users undertake. The results will be analysed to determine if the different users 
defined by their demographics are more vulnerable than others are to being phished by 
one or more of the categories. 
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1.4 Research Methodologies 
The research methodologies used in this study included primary research collecting 
demographic information and participants answers from a scored survey on the three 
defined categories of phishing attacks. A survey format was the chosen research method 
for this study, utilised to acquire responses from the population group. The survey was 
administered online so the target population could be reached more easily and the results 
could be obtained quicker. The format of the survey presented each question with 
mandatory status, providing respondents with pre-defined answers. This ensured that 
each participant completed the survey fully, and prevented the risk of partial responses 
which would render the answers unusable.  
The participants were presented with five questions relating to each category of 
phishing. Each question asked the respondent if it is legitimate or not i.e. would they use 
and interact with the content as if they normally would. Quantitative research was carried 
out by statistically analysing if a difference exists between the mean scores of each 
category among the demographic groups. The quantitative methodology was selected 
because of the types of data analysis that are needed in order to accurately draw 
conclusions from the data gathered. Empirical analysis of the data was carried out to 
either accept or reject the defined hypotheses. An inductive approach was used to 
develop theories on the vulnerability of demographic groups per phishing category. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
The literary research for this study covers many topics, from phishing to how and why 
people fall victim to phishing attacks and historically what demographics are most 
vulnerable. The assessment of vulnerability to a particular type of phishing was limited 
to three that were viewed as the most prevalent and dangerous. There are wide ranges of 
different phishing attacks, and it would be unachievable to assess each type given the 
scope of this research. 
The survey will attempt to assess demographic vulnerability in respect to the three types 
of phishing identified. It would be preferable to assess a large number of demographics 
but given the wide range of different demographics that exist, and the scope of this 
research project, five were selected. The limitations of this study include such areas as 
non-response bias. Those who choose not to respond to the survey could have different 
views and phishing awareness than those who do. Given the number of categories per 
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demographic group, which will divide the amount of responses across the group, a large 
sample size is needed if the results are to obtain a high statistical power. If low response 
numbers are recorded for some of the categories within a demographic group, it will be 
hard to infer robust results. One aim of this research was to project the results onto a 
larger population. With generalisability in mind, it may be hard to do this without a 
proper random sample obtained. 
1.6 Document Outline 
 Chapter 2: This consists of the literature review, which will outline what 
phishing is, how attacks are performed and the different types of phishing. 
Demographic vulnerability to phishing and how to counteract it are also 
presented. 
 Chapter 3: This chapter outlines the design and methodology of the study. It 
focuses on why a survey was used for data collection and the statistical tools and 
methods used to analyse the data.  
 Chapter 4: This chapter illustrates the distribution of the demographic groups 
as well as the significant descriptive statistics that were recorded. Finally, the 
statistical analysis is carried out that will conclude whether or not the null 
hypotheses are rejected.  
 Chapter 5: This discusses the results obtained from Chapter 4 in light of what is 
already known. The results are used to confirm or refute previous work and 
highlight what new findings have emerged.  
 Chapter 6: This gives a short account of the results obtained and the research 
problem that was being addressed. Limitations of the study are highlighted and 
any future work that might be undertaken is recommended.  
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2 Literature Review and Related Work 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a number of topics are discussed that will present an overview of phishing 
and some of the important points relating to how attacks are carried out and demographic 
vulnerability. Firstly, a description of the origins of phishing and why people fall for 
phishing attacks are introduced. The anatomy of how phishing attacks are usually 
performed and the different types of phishing that exist are discussed. Furthermore, 
analysis of the literature that discusses demographic vulnerability to phishing and 
approaches on how to deal with and counteract phishing are presented.  
This chapter’s purpose is to set out and identify the concepts that relate to the research 
question and to highlight any gaps in the literature that may exist between phishing and 
demographic vulnerability. 
2.2 What is Phishing? 
Phishing is a type of social engineering attack in which cybercriminals use fake or 
spoofed emails and deceitful web sites in order to trick people into giving out sensitive 
information. Social engineering is “any act that influences someone to take an action 
that may or may not be in his or her best interest” (Hadnagy, 2014, p. 27). The victims 
of these attacks perceive the emails and websites as legitimate but they are the work of 
criminals looking to perform fraud and identity theft (Sheng & Magnien, 2007). 
Although the exact origins of phishing may be open to debate, Symantec report that the 
first instances of phishing attacks occurred in the mid 1990’s targeting America Online 
(AOL) (Symantec, 2007). They go on to say “The attackers typically used either instant 
messages or email to trick users into divulging their AOL passwords. Victims would 
provide the attackers with this information, which the attackers would, in-turn, leverage 
to assume ownership of the victim’s AOL account”. 
Parno, Kuo, & Perrig (2006), concluded that phishing was a growing problem that 
threatens businesses and consumers due to its exploitative nature. It is widely seen as 
the most common form of fraud to steal personal information (Eisenstein, 2007; Keith 
B. Anderson, Erik Durbin & Salinger, 2008). The damage caused is not just financial as 
trust from customers is also affected. Due to the phish usually appearing as if it is from 
a reputable source, the reputation of the business might also be damaged in the process. 
Consumers may associate the negative effects of the fraud with the company and might 
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stop using their services completely. According to a Gartner survey in 2007, “3.6 million 
U.S. adults lost a total of 3.2 billion dollars directly due to phishing” (Huang et al., 2009). 
Phishing attacks usually begin by targeting the public and aiming to steal personal 
information but it has also evolved to target more high profile victims. This is known as 
whaling, a process where senior executives within a business are targeted in the hopes 
they reveal sensitive company information or corporate secrets. 
2.3 Why We Fall for Phishing Attacks 
Many users fall victim to phishing attacks because they lack the knowledge to properly 
identify them (Sheng et al., 2010). Cybercriminals prey on people’s vulnerabilities and 
take advantage of this by attempting to phish the victim using fear tactics, strict deadlines 
or stressful situations. Research shows that there are several reasons why people are 
vulnerable to phishing attacks (Sheng et al., 2010). The authors state “people tend to 
judge a website’s legitimacy by its look and feel which attackers can easily replicate”.  
There are a number of tools at the disposal of cybercriminals to clone a reputable web 
site such as LinkedIn or Facebook. The Social Engineer Toolkit and httrack using Kali 
Linux can clone webpages and potentially trick the user into entering personal 
information (Anoop, 2016).  Some of the earliest studies investigating why people fall 
for phishing attacks were undertaken by (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Downs, 
Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006; Downs et al., 2007; Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel, 2006). 
 Dhamija et al., (2006), states, “22 participants were shown 20 web sites and 
asked to determine which ones were fraudulent”.  They found that 90% of the 
participants were fooled by the best phishing sites, with few noticing the security 
indicators presented to them.  
 
 Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel (2006) commented, “Users fail to continuously check 
the browser’s security indicators, since maintaining security is not the user’s 
primary goal”. The authors attribute this to the users relying on the web content 
to decide if the site is authentic or not. This supports the point from Sheng et al., 
(2010), clearly showing that users do not spend much time judging whether the 
site is real or spoofed outside of the content displayed to them.  
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 Third, the perceived consequences are not a good predictor of identifying or 
avoiding a phishing attack. Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor (2007) state, “The 
ratings of consequences suggest that fear of credit card theft is not a great 
motivator for protecting one’s information”. The authors go on to note, 
“protections against phishing might not gain much traction from warnings about 
how easy it would be for a phisher to steal one’s card.”  
 
 Lastly, although users may be aware of phishing, it does not reduce their 
vulnerability to identifying an attack as they employ their own methods to 
decipher whether the content is real or spoofed (Downs et al., 2006). Downs et 
al., (2006), go on to say “Participants used various strategies to make decisions 
about the trustworthiness of email, mostly centred around interpreting the text of 
the email rather than any more reliable cues in headers or URLs associated with 
links”.  
2.4 Anatomy of an Attack 
A phishing attack may seem like an easy, juvenile fraud but there are layers to it that 
require expertise and knowledge to exploit people’s natural tendencies. According to 
Hong (2012), there are three major phases to a phishing attack.  
1. The first is for potential victims to receive a phish. Most phishing scams are sent 
via email as they can be quickly produced and mass distributed. As previously 
mentioned, the phish usually uses social techniques, rather than technical tricks 
to fool end users. The author remarks, “Conveying urgency is a well-known 
method used by criminals to misdirect people’s attention. An example is 
pretending to be a system administrator warning people about a new attack, 
urging them to install the attached patch.” 
 
2. The second is the victim performing the suggested action in the message. Once 
the victim has incorrectly flagged the phishing attempt as real, they are usually 
asked to do something such as install software or follow a hyperlink. Most 
phishing attacks try to convince people to go to a spoofed website where personal 
and sensitive information will be collected. “The user connects to a spoof website 
by clicking on a link in the email. Their web browser may access the website 
directly or be redirected from an initial site to the actual phishing pages” (Moore 
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& Clayton, 2007). The scammers will usually try to host a fake site using a 
compromised machine or register a new domain. When registering a new 
domain, the scammers look for names similar to the site they want to 
impersonate, and employ homograph attacks2. These are done to “exploit the 
visual similarity of characters, for example, bankofthevvest.com uses two v’s to 
look like a w” (Hong, 2012). 
 
3. Finally, the third is the criminal monetising stolen information. Once the user 
has been presented with an accurate clone of the target site, they are usually 
requested to fill in their personal information. “The compromised details are 
usually emailed to a webmail address, but are sometimes stored in plain text files 
at the spoof website, awaiting direct collection by the fraudster” (Moore & 
Clayton, 2007). Once the details are received, they are usually then sold on to 
cashiers who will target areas such as bank accounts. Moore and Clayton (2007), 
go on to say, “The mean lifetime of a normal phishing site is 61.69 hours”, 
illustrating how quickly this type of fraud can happen and disappear without a 
trace. 
2.5 Types of Phishing Attacks 
This study will look to demonstration the potential vulnerabilities certain demographics 
have in relation to three categories of phishing attack. Email is the most common form 
of phishing, capable of many attack vectors such as deceptive phishing, malware attacks 
and DNS based attacks (Jones, Towse, & Race, 2015). 
 Email  
Due to the reliance on email by most of the people in the world for either business or 
personal use, the number of potential targets for cybercriminals is massive. Sending an 
e-mail and asking for a user’s bank account login details is a simple idea and it costs 
almost nothing. “Each day more and more e-mails are sent with the aim of making the 
web users believe that the same is legitimate and from the trusted institutions” (Purkait, 
2012). Email phishing can take place in many ways, each with their own level of 
creativity and deception. One of the most common methods employed to trick a user is 
to convey a sense of urgency, such as notifying the victim they have failed to login 
                                                 
2 A homograph is a letter or string that is visually confusable with a different letter or string - 
https://www.gribble.org/papers/usenix06_homograph.pdf 
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multiple times and must verify their account details or risk severe consequences (Hong, 
2012).  
As aforementioned in Chapter 1.1, research was conducted using a survey prior to this 
study with twenty-three cyber security professionals, examining whether anti-phishing 
training and education could prevent attacks against organisations. Of the twenty-three 
participants, twelve stated that they have received a phishing email in the last six months 
intending to steal their personal information as illustrated in the figure below. A further 
ten respondents remarked that they have received both an email and phone call from an 
unreliable source trying to steal their personal information (Griffin, 2017). 
 
Figure 2-1: Number of fraudulent attempts to steal data 
 
 Spear Phishing 
Spear phishing is a more sophisticated form of email phishing, which is utilised to target 
individuals, small groups or organisations. Zhao, An, & Kiekintveld (2016), state that it 
“uses personal information and social engineering to craft very believable messages with 
the goal of inducing the recipient to open an attachment, or visit an unsafe website by 
clicking a link.” Although similar to regular email phishing, spear phishing is a much 
more costly process than sending spam email messages in the hopes of an everyday user 
interacting with it. For example, if a cybercriminal is looking for specific data that an 
organisation holds, they must first find out who has access to the data and target those 
people specifically (Wardman, 2016).  
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 Content Spoofing 
Content spoofing refers to an attack when a criminal inserts malicious content into a 
legitimate site in order to trick the user into thinking it is real. This malicious content 
can “redirect to other sites, install malware on a user’s computer, or insert a frame of 
content that will redirect data to a phishing server” (Jakobsson, Myers, 2006, p36). These 
types of attacks are made possible by an injection vulnerability in the web application 
that fails to correctly handle user-supplied data. It is possible for cybercriminals to lure 
a victim into viewing spoofed content by inserting malicious links into emails, web 
pages or forums. Such spoofing attempts can be hindered if the users are trained and 
know what to look for within the content of the page. Kong (2011), states, “However, a 
hacker may modify the information and the links in an established website by altering 
the content on the server of a legitimate organisation. This mode of content spoofing is 
more difficult to detect because the casual Internet user cannot tell whether the page is 
legitimate or not.”  
 Smishing 
A mobile device is defined as a small computing device, usually with a small output 
screen, which may have touch input or miniaturised keyboard (W. C. Hu, Y. Zuo, 2009). 
In 2016, it was estimated that over 62% of the world’s population owned a mobile phone, 
with that number expecting to exceed five billion by 20193. Today, the use of mobile 
phones is almost a necessity in order to browse the internet or use the devices 
applications; be it for business or personal use (Parasuraman, 2017). Due to phishing 
being on a dramatic rise, it comes as no surprise that phishing via landline and mobile 
phones is now a big concern. Instead of a phishing attack happening through email or a 
spoofed webpage, smishing relies on short messaging services (SMS) or text messages 
(Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor 2014). Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor (2014), expresses 
there are two main processes for smishing scams. The first “involves receiving a text 
message which is purported to have originated from a known and trusted source, such 
as your bankers or your system administrator”. The second “involves you receiving a 
vital text message about your identity been stolen or account number been frozen”. As 
                                                 
3 Statistics taken from https://www.statista.com/statistics/274774/forecast-of-mobile-phone-users-
worldwide/ 
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previously mentioned in chapter 2.3, the same human instincts of fear, stress and severe 
consequences are preyed upon to have the user fall for this fraud. The SMS or text 
message then directs you to a website via hyperlink or a phone number so you can verify 
your details. Upon receiving this sensitive information, the cybercriminals use it to 
withdraw money from the victim’s bank account or attempt to set up a new credit card 
with their name. Smishing also has the added danger of attachments being sent with the 
original message, which the victim thinks is from a reputable source. This can lead to 
“the attachment downloading a virus or malware unto the victim’s device which in turn 
installs a root kit or backdoor for the scammers to have access to everything on the 
phone” (Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor, 2014). 
 Vishing 
Vishing is another form of phishing involving phone calls, where the attacker attempts 
to lure the victim into providing personal information and exploit this information for 
personal gain. The term is derived from two different words, voice and phishing. 
Attackers tend to favour Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) rather than traditional 
telephone phone calls, as the whole process can be brought up and down in a short time. 
Noblis (2007, p. 42), gives a description of a typical vishing attack, where “an attacker 
calls a large number of telephone numbers, spoofing their Caller ID credentials to appear 
to be originating from a credit card company or some other trusted provider. They direct 
consumers to a telephone number that they control to collect personal information to be 
used for fraud, often using a voice response system.” 
2.6 Demographics 
“Previous work suggests that users’ demographics are useful indicators in identifying 
the most vulnerable users to phishing attacks” (Mohebzada, Zarka, Bhojani, & Darwish, 
2012). There have been some studies completed to analyse how vulnerable certain 
demographics are to phishing attacks (Gavett et al., 2017a; Kumaraguru et al., 2009b; 
Sheng et al., 2010). The studies that have been carried out to analyse demographic 
vulnerability to phishing have revolved around the user’s age or gender. There appears 
to be gaps in the knowledge when the research involves other demographics such as 
income, education and occupation. This became evident during the literature collection 
process due to the lack of peer-reviewed research available. 
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 Age and Gender 
Research has been carried out to examine why phishing occurs but only a few studies 
look at the demographic factors relating to phishing vulnerability.  Kumaraguru et 
al.,(2009) undertook a real world phishing study to investigate demographic factors to 
phishing susceptibility. The project which comprised of 515 participants concluded that 
there was no significant difference among gender in the tendency to fall for phishing 
emails. The 18-25 age group was consistently seen as the most vulnerable age group to 
phishing attacks. Similarly, Sheng et al., undertook a study in 2010 to examine the 
relationship between demographics and phishing susceptibility. The authors performed 
a roleplay phishing exercise to analyse these factors and view the effectiveness of anti-
phishing educational material. They found that “women are more susceptible than men 
to phishing” and supporting Kumaraguru et al., “participants between the ages of 18 and 
25 are more susceptible to phishing than other age groups” (Sheng et al., 2010). These 
findings suggest that younger individuals are more vulnerable to a phishing attack. This 
could be due to a number of reasons such as a lack of education in the subject matter or 
being too trust worthy of web content presented to them. In a study by Gavett et al., 
(2017), the authors sought to determine whether older adults are more vulnerable to 
phishing attacks. They commented that “compared to younger adults, older adults were 
more likely to have knowledge of phishing and more likely to have been victimised by 
phishing in the past”. This is an interesting point as it could explain why younger 
individuals are more vulnerable to phishing. Gavett et al., (2017), further backs up this 
claim by remarking that in relation to phishing attacks, “being an older adult was 
associated with 3.69 time’s greater odds of being suspicious relative to younger adults”. 
 Education 
In a study by Dhamija et al., (2006), 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked 
to determine which ones were fraudulent. They concluded that, “Good phishing websites 
fooled 90% of participants”. The authors found that there was “no significant correlation 
between education level and scores.” They also stated, “Among our participants, we did 
not observe a relationship between scores and sex, age, educational level or experience.  
A larger study is needed to establish or rule out the existence of such effects in the 
general population.”  
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 Income 
Little research appears to have been undertaken to analyse whether income is a factor in 
vulnerability to phishing. It makes sense that cybercriminals would target victims with 
more assets in order to maximise their rewards but the literature suggest differently. 
Leukfeldt (2014) investigates phishing victims, and the increased or decreased risk of 
victimisation. Leukfeldt studies whether victims have significantly higher income and 
financial assets than non-victims and the results show that financial characteristics do 
not seem to play a role. He goes on to say, “An unemployed person on a shoestring 
budget or a director of a multinational company: everyone has an equal chance of 
becoming a victim. There seems to be no evidence for so-called spear-phishing attacks 
on specific targets with lots of money.” 
 Occupation/Student 
In contrast to income and education, there has been some research performed to look at 
vulnerability to phishing regarding of whether the user is a student or employed. 
Unfortunately, most of this research is not peer reviewed and reported on by 
organisational reports. In a study by Mohebzada et al., (2012), the authors performed 
two real life large scale phishing attacks on 10,917 members of a university including 
students and faculty. The experiments involved “sending spoofed emails which seemed 
to come from legitimate sources” which were intended to trick the subjects into revealing 
their confidential information. The author’s found that 9% of the enrolled students and 
alumni fell for the phishing attack. Comparing the results between students and faculty, 
it emerged that “students were more prone to phishing attacks…which indicates that 
experience could be a factor in victimising an individual during a social engineering 
attack.” Similarly, in a study by Metzger, Flanagin, & Zwarun (2003), the authors 
recorded both students and non-students ability to evaluate potentially spoofed online 
content. The results showed that “students generally found all sources of information to 
be more credible than the non-students did, rating all channels except the Internet as 
significantly more credible as did the non-students.” These findings illustrate that 
students are more trustworthy of online content presented to them and could potentially 
be more vulnerable to a phishing attack.  
McAfee reported in their August, 2014 threat analysis that “employees working at 
accounting, finance and HR performed the worst at recognising phishing attempts, while 
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these are departments that arguably hold some of the most sensitive data of the 
organisation” (McAfee, 2014). 
2.7 Dealing with Phishing 
 Approaches to Examining the Problem 
Due to the rapid growth of phishing and its potential impact, several methods are usually 
undertaken to examine user vulnerability. These include either a questionnaire or survey 
to collect user data and some sort of visual exam to test the participant’s knowledge and 
reactions (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2017; Butler, 2007; Downs et al., 2006; 
Erkkilä, 2011; Jansson & Von Solms, 2013; Kumaraguru et al., 2009b; Sheng et al., 
2010). Such approaches are typically undertaken due to their proficiency for collecting 
and analysing user data as the tests can be done in a safe ‘lab’ environment. Other real 
world examples are employed such as sending out phishing emails to an entire student 
campus or organisation and measuring the success rate (Rocha Flores, Holm, Nohlberg, 
& Ekstedt, 2015). These are often the best methods to capture real phishing statistics but 
include their own ethical and privacy issues.  
 Methods to Counteract Phishing 
The most successful techniques to counteract phishing attacks rely on interactive demos, 
online training materials, testing and situated learning in order to outline where these 
attacks occur and how to identify them (Jensen, Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher, 2017; 
Lastdrager, Gallardo, Junger, & Hartel, 2017; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012). Jensen, 
Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher (2017), state that “to prevent phishing attacks, organisations 
often rely on three techniques”:  
1. “Automated removal or quarantine of phishing messages and corresponding 
websites”. 
 
2. “Automated warning mechanisms that notify individuals when they encounter a 
suspicious message or website”. 
 
3. “Behavioural training during which individuals are taught to identify and report 
attacks”. 
Training materials are usually published by security firms, non-profit organisations and 
government entities in an effort to inform the public and organisations of the potential 
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dangers. Griffin (2017) states that “in a paper by Sheng & Magnien (2007), the authors 
design and evaluate the implementation of an anti-phishing online game, Anti-Phishing 
Phil.”  Learning science principles were employed to design and iteratively refine the 
game, which was evaluated through a user study. They found that “the participants who 
played the game were better able to identify fraudulent web sites compared to the 
participants in other conditions.” Training and education appear to be among the best 
techniques in order to mitigate against phishing attacks. Similarly to Sheng & Magnien 
(2007), another study was undertaken by Kumaraguru et al., (2009b), to test the long-
term retention of anti-phishing training by users. Five hundred and fifteen participants 
were split evenly among three groups, which were control, single training and multiple 
training. The participants were all sent a series of legitimate and illegitimate spear 
phishing emails over the course of one month and the two training groups received a 
series of anti-phishing training material in this time. The results of the study show that: 
1. “Users trained with PhishGuru retain knowledge even after 28 days.” 
2. “Adding a second training message to reinforce the original training decreases 
the likelihood of people giving information to phishing websites.” 
2.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a variety of literature relating to phishing was examined. Firstly, an 
outline of phishing, its origins and how it has become a serious threat to businesses and 
consumers was considered. A discussion on why users fall for phishing attacks was 
introduced and four key points were highlighted as the primary contributing factors. The 
anatomy of phishing attacks were identified, discussing the three main phases that 
usually occur when an attack is carried out. Furthermore, several of the most common 
types of phishing were explored, detailing how they are used to exploit vulnerable users 
and the constant adaptation that they utilise in order to remain dangerous and undetected. 
Additionally, demographic vulnerability to phishing was reviewed from what is already 
known. Age, gender, income, education and occupation were selected as the five 
demographics to be analysed and the apparent gaps that exist in the literature relating to 
them were identified. Finally, the approaches to dealing with phishing and the most 
effective methods to counteract phishing attacks were examined. 
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3 Design and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the design and methodology used in order to carry out the study. 
It begins by giving a brief overview of the design and why new information was needed 
in order to complete the study. A breakdown of each demographic is described and the 
reasons for choosing the categories that make up the demographic groups. The reasons 
for choosing a survey as an adequate data collection mechanism are explained and why 
a convenience sample was used rather than a random sample. A more detailed 
explanation of the design is outlined; breaking down the survey into its two sections and 
mentions how the respondent population was targeted. Finally, the statistical tools and 
methods used to analyse the data are presented and any necessary expectations of the 
data are explained. 
3.2 Design Overview 
As aforementioned in Chapter 1, little research has been completed to study 
demographic factors relating to the vulnerability of phishing. A thorough search of the 
relevant literature was conducted and it appears that none have been undertaken linking 
these demographic factors with vulnerability to specific categories of phishing. Due to 
this, new information needed to be gathered to allow an up to date study to be completed. 
Although there are many different types of phishing, three have been selected due to 
their recurring nature and potential to cause harm (Hong, 2012; Huang et al., 2009). The 
three types of phishing that will be analysed in this study are: 
1. Email 
2. SMiShing 
3. Content Spoofing 
The first stage of this study was to prepare a survey that investigates how vulnerable 
users are to the three defined categories of phishing attacks. The first section of the 
survey collected demographic information so the participants can be gathered into their 
respective demographic groups. The second section contained five questions relating to 
each of the three phishing categories described above. 
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 Demographic Breakdown 
In order to accurately track demographic information of the respondents, each 
demographic set had several categories. For gender, the respondents could be male or 
female and to study age, the demographic set was divided into the following groups: 
1. 18-25 
2. 26-35 
3. 36-45 
4. 46-55 
5. 56 + 
Educational categories were chosen using the European Qualifications Framework 
(EQF) due to this study not being exclusively limited to Ireland. It is used as “an 
overarching qualifications framework, which would serve as a translation device to 
make qualifications more readable and understandable across different countries and 
systems in Europe” (EFQ, 2009). The EFQ utilises eight levels, which are categorised 
by a set of descriptors to indicate the relevant learning qualifications. The first four levels 
were discarded, as the study is not concerned with the participant’s earlier achievements 
such as the Junior or Leaving Certificate. The lowest education category a respondent 
could select was Level 5, which is the equivalent of an associate degree. This degree is 
awarded by colleges upon completion of a course that usually lasts two years. Level 6 
consists of a Bachelor’s degree or a higher diploma while level 7 is a Master’s degree or 
postgraduate diploma. Level 8 refers to a Doctorate degree or higher doctorate and is the 
highest level of education that can be chosen by participants. Finally, an option for 
“None of the above” was added if the participant did not have any of the outlined 
degrees. The options participants could select from are highlighted below: 
1. Level 5 (Advanced/Higher Certificate) 
2. Level 6 (Bachelor’s Degree/Higher Diploma) 
3. Level 7 (Master's Degree/Postgraduate Diploma) 
4. Level 8 (Doctorate Degree/Higher Doctorate) 
5. None of the above 
Income was also tracked between several brackets to reflect the respondent’s current 
yearly earnings. This information coupled with the other responses could be too intrusive 
for some participants, so the option to not disclose their income was added. 
20 
 
1. € 0 - 20,000 
2. € 20,000 - 30,000 
3. € 30,000 - 40,000 
4. € 40,000 - 50,000 
5. € 50,000 - 60,000 
6. € 60,000 + 
7. I don't want to disclose 
Finally, the respondents would then answer whether they were a student or working, and 
if so, what industry they work in. Due to the large number of industries that people can 
work in, several of the most all-encompassing were chosen in order to get accurate 
results, which were: 
1. Agriculture 
2. Business/Finance 
3. Education 
4. Healthcare 
5. Information Technology 
6. Manufacturing 
7. Media 
8. Student 
3.3 Survey Design and Responses 
 Why a Survey was used 
The term ‘survey’ refers to the selection of a relatively large sample of people from a 
pre-determined population. This is usually followed by a collection of data from the 
individuals with which the researcher makes an inference about the wider population 
known as the population of interest (Kelley, Clark, Brown, & Sitzia, 2003). This study 
was undertaken with the hopes that the results could be projected onto a larger 
population set, with generalisability in mind. Some of the advantages of using a survey 
given the nature of this study are noted by (Kelley et al., 2003). 
1. “The research produces data based on real world observations (empirical data)”. 
This is true as the phishing samples used in the survey come from real world 
phishing attacks. This allowed the participants to see first-hand how deceptive 
and legitimate phishing attacks have become. 
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2. “Surveys can produce a large amount of data in a short time for a fairly low cost”. 
Due to the project life cycle of this study only lasting several months, it was 
concluded that a survey was an ideal research strategy in order to capture 
representative results quickly. 
 
3. “The breadth of coverage of many people or events means that it is more likely 
than some other approaches to obtain data based on a representative sample, and 
can therefore be generalisable to a population”. This is yet another reason why a 
survey was selected because it is hoped that this research will accurately project 
the results to a larger population set. 
Piloting of the survey was necessary so the respondents can easily understand the 
concept, the questions presented and the instructions displayed. Piloting is a process of 
testing the research strategy/tool on a sample of members from the target population and 
is helpful in highlighting whether sufficient responses are available to the participants. 
It is important that when conducting a pilot, that the same procedure be used as if it was 
the real survey to outline any potential problems with responses.  
The study set out to be able to project the results onto a wider population utilising a large 
random sample to gather responses. Brant, Haas-Haseman, Wei, Wickham, & Ponto 
(2015), remark that using this method will “increases the likelihood that the responses 
from the sample will accurately reflect the entire population.” The authors go on to say, 
“in order to accurately draw conclusions about the population, the sample must include 
individuals with characteristics similar to the population.” For this study, it was 
improbable to accurately obtain a random sample given the time constraints and cost it 
could incur. For example, gathering population information from third party sources 
such as a company could incur a cost. It may also take a significant amount of time to 
retrieve this information with no guarantee of completion. Due to this, a convenience 
sample was used which is a type of nonprobability sample that obtains responses in any 
way possible. Etikan (2016), states it is “where members of the target population that 
meet certain practical criteria, such as easy accessibility, geographical proximity, 
availability at a given time, or the willingness to participate are included for the purpose 
of the study.” It may be difficult to make valid inferences about the larger population 
group because this is probably not a true random sample. In order to mitigate against 
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this, a snowball sample was also employed which asks the respondents to suggest 
another person or group of people willing to participate in the study. With the amount 
of demographic information being collected from the respondents and the large number 
of categories per demographic set, it is hoped that it will be feasible to accurately project 
the results onto a larger population.  
Another way to mitigate against the potential lack of generalisability is to increase the 
sample size. There is no definitive answer as to how many responses are necessary for 
a survey and this study is an analysis of quantitative data. Due to this, responses needed 
to be high in order to give a better estimate of the population.  
 Design 
The online survey was created using Google Forms for several reasons such as the ability 
to easily distribute it among multiple social media platforms and its built-in statistics 
and analytics. In order to accurately test the participants against the types of phishing 
attacks that are present today, several data sources were utilised to get the samples used 
in the survey. Personal email accounts, mobile phones and online phishing databases 
such as Phishtank4 were used to collect the samples. Many different samples were 
identified as potential options to be used in the survey. The samples, which were chosen 
to be included in the survey, were selected due to their ability to look like a genuine web 
page or request. This was done to give a lasting impression of how dangerous and 
concealed phishing can be. The survey was split into two sections, which are as follows: 
Section 1 
Section 1 collected demographic information from five key areas, which were: 
1. Gender 
2. Age 
3. Education 
4. Income 
5. Occupation/Student 
As described above in chapter 2, it is clear that some demographic information has been 
analysed in previous studies to show how vulnerable users are to phishing. From the 
research, age and gender are the main demographic factors which have been previously 
                                                 
4 https://www.phishtank.com/developer_info.php 
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studied. In order to obtain new data on what other demographics are most vulnerable, 
five were selected to extend the research.  
Section 2 
Section 2 then presented the participants with questions. The questions were divided 
between the three phishing categories as follow: 
 Question 1 – 5: Email Phishing 
 Question 6 – 10: Smishing 
 Question 11 – 15: Content Spoofing 
The questions were in the form of screenshots using real world phishing examples taken 
from the sources listed above. These images were harmless depictions of real phishing 
examples and legitimate sites, which was important from an ethical point of view. Each 
category contained several real phishing examples and several genuine requests, which 
tested how accurately the participants could identify the phishing attacks. The 
participants answered whether the information presented to them was legitimate or not, 
assessing if they would interact with the content like normal. A binary scoring system 
of zero and one was used per question, zero indicating an incorrect answer and one 
indicating a correct answer. This left the participants with three separate scores out of 
five, relating to each of the three phishing categories and a total score out of fifteen.  
 Respondent Population   
The research studied members of multiple demographic groups who participated in the 
survey. Surveying multiple demographic groups with no limiting restrictions allowed 
for greater participation due to the larger number of possible respondents. In order to 
gather responses to the survey, it was distributed electronically to third party social and 
professional groups. The survey was not distributed via internal corporate channels; this 
removed the necessity for permission of distribution. Social media sites such as 
Facebook, LinkedIn and WhatsApp, as well as third party participants who were 
reachable via email were also utilised. As previously stated, this type of sampling is 
known as convenience sampling in order to generate responses which can have a 
negative effect on the generalisability of the results (Etikan, 2016). To mitigate against 
this, the participants within the convenience sample were asked to share the survey link 
to their own friends, family and professional colleagues where possible. This is a term 
known as snowballing and it was employed to increase the number of respondents who 
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completed the survey and distribute it to a wider population (Dragan & Isaic-Maniu, 
2013).  This also allowed for greater generalisability of the results across a larger 
population set.  Before the survey was distributed to the population, piloting was 
performed on five participants in order to confirm that the survey was understandable. 
All participants were informed of the format of the survey once they opened it, which 
clearly listed the instructions and what information would be collected. The survey did 
not obtain any identifiable information such as name or email address and each question 
was mandatory, to reduce the number of incorrect and thus unusable responses. Due to 
the data being divided among the various demographic groups, this could potentially 
harm the statistical legitimacy of the results. For example, if only four respondents are 
male and 50 are female, no statistical analysis can be concluded due to the imbalance of 
sample sizes (Button et al., 2013a). With this in mind, the target sample size was between 
eighty and one hundred participants, which should allow enough responses in order to 
accurately draw conclusions. The timeframe for the data collection phase was three 
weeks, to allow enough time to gather an adequate number of responses. 
 Preamble  
When participants open the survey, they are first presented with a preamble as seen 
below, intended to provide context about the survey and how it should be undertaken. 
This was also done to reassure them of the anonymity of their responses, which was an 
important step due to the volume of demographic information collected.  
This anonymous quiz contains 15 questions relating to three phishing categories 
(5 per category).  
Section 1 will collect some demographic information then the questions are 
presented in Section 2.  
Each question will contain an image and you will answer if the content is: 
1. Real (you would interact with it like normal and follow the links presented)  
or  
2. Fake (a malicious attempt to trick the user or steal information) 
Please note, once you fill in this survey, your responses will be treated in a highly 
confidential manner. No identifiable information such as your name or email 
address is collected and no third party will have access to this data. 
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3.4 Statistical Tools and Methods Used 
 Variables 
The survey collected data through variables known as categorical variables. Categorical 
variables provide a means for the information to be sorted into categories, for example, 
gender is either “Male” or “Female”. Every piece of information gathered belongs to 
one category and a respondent cannot be part of more than one category per demographic 
group. There are several types of categorical variables which the data belongs to. Ordinal 
variables relate to when the variables have some order applied to them. An example of 
this is recording income levels for a group of people in a variable called income. One 
person makes less than €20,000 per year, another makes between €20,000-40,000 while 
another makes €40,000 or more. These income levels fit nicely into defined categories 
as the income figure increases. From within the collected dataset, age, education and 
income are marked as ordinal variables.  
Nominal variables are the opposite of ordinal variables because they do not contain any 
defined order. For example, a variable called location, which records where a person 
lives, is nominal because each of the categories do not have an order or numeric value. 
Due to this, gender and occupation are counted as nominal variables within the collected 
data set.  
 Two-sample T Test 
A two-sample t test was used in order to analyse gender with the four test score 
dependant variables. Skaik (2015), states, “It is used to know whether the unknown 
means of two populations are different from each other based on independent samples 
from each population.” This test requires that the two independent variables are 
unrelated to each other and is only valid for comparing two means from a quantitative 
variable. The data comes from a single population which has been divided into two 
groups, male and female so it meets all the requirements in order to perform the two 
sample t test. Skaik (2015) , goes on to say “If the study aims to compare three or more 
means, then it is better to use an analysis of variance to avoid the loss of control over the 
experiment-wise significant level.” A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used 
for the remaining four demographic groups as they contain more than two categories 
each.  
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 One-way Anova 
For the statistical analysis, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was selected for 
demographic groups that contained more than two categories. It is used to determine if 
the mean of a dependant variable is the same in three or more mutually independent 
variables. For this study, the dependant variables are: 
1. Total Test Score 
2. Category 1 Test Score 
3. Category 2 Test Score 
4. Category 3 Test Score 
The independent variables refer to the different categories in each demographic group 
e.g. for education, they are: 
1. Level 5 (Advanced/Higher Certificate) 
2. Level 6 (Bachelor’s Degree/Higher Diploma) 
3. Level 7 (Master's Degree/Postgraduate Diploma) 
4. Level 8 (Doctorate Degree/Higher Doctorate) 
5. None of the above 
The one-way Anova uses the mean value from the dependant and independent variables 
to show if there is a difference between the two. This model was used to determine 
whether the differences between the categories were statistically significant, with the 
significance level or alpha set to 5% or (α = .05). Lavrakas (2008), states, “Alpha is a 
threshold value used to judge whether a test statistic is statistically significant”. The 
author goes on to say, “Alpha represents an acceptable probability of a Type I error in a 
statistical test”. When a statistical significance is found between categories of a 
demographic group, it is possible to determine which category or categories were 
significantly different from each other by using a post hoc test. Post hoc tests are needed 
“because the one-way ANOVA is an omnibus test and cannot tell you which specific 
groups were significantly different from each other; it only tells you that at least two 
groups were different.5” To alleviate against this, a post hoc test is run which is explained 
by Kim (2017). “When comparing the population means of three mutually independent 
groups A, B, and C, if the significance level is 0.05, then the significance level used for 
                                                 
5 https://statistics.laerd.com/stata-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-stata.php 
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comparisons of groups A and B, groups A and C, and groups B and C would be 0.05/3 
= 0.017”. 
Before a one way Anova can be run, there are six assumptions that need to be met in 
order to analyse the data. If any of the six assumptions are not met, it will not be possible 
to analyse the data effectively due to the results being invalid. The six assumptions of a 
one way Anova are: 
Assumption 1: The dependant variable should be measured at the continuous level. The 
dependant variables of this study are test scores, which are continuously measured at 
either 0 to 5 or 0 to 15.  
Assumption 2: “The independent variable should consist of two or more categorical, 
independent groups”6. This assumption is met as each demographic group contains two 
or more unrelated groups. 
Assumption 3: An independence of observations should be met so there is no 
relationship between the observations in each group or between groups. This assumption 
is also met.  
Assumption 4: There should be no significant outliers within the dataset. These are 
simply values within the data that are much higher or lower than most other values, 
which could skew the results. This assumption is met because STATA can detect outliers 
when running the one way Anova.  
Assumption 5: The “dependent variable should be approximately normally distributed 
for each category of the independent variable”7. The one way Anova is quite robust to 
violations of these assumptions and due to this, the data needs to be approximately 
normal in order to provide valid results. The normality of the data was tested using the 
Shapiro-Wilk test in STATA as well as analysing the histogram which can be seen in 
Figure 3-1 below. “The word ‘normal’ here means that the data complies with a 
distribution pattern that mathematically allows parametric statistical tests to be applied” 
(Marshall & Jonker, 2010). 
 
                                                 
6 https://statistics.laerd.com/stata-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-stata.php 
7 https://statistics.laerd.com/stata-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-stata.php 
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Figure 3-1: Histogram to identify the normality of data 
 
Assumption 6: Finally, using the Levene’s test in STATA, there needs to be 
homogeneity of variances. This was undertaken using the robvar model of Levene’s test 
for each variable and it was concluded there was equality of variances between the 
groups.  
 Statistical Software 
In order to perform statistical analysis on the data collected from the survey, STATA 
was selected. STATA is “a complete, integrated statistical software package that 
provides everything you need for data analysis, data management, and graphics8”.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the design and methodology used in order to carry out the study. 
A detailed explanation of how the demographics are broken down was introduced such 
as using the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) for education. The reasons why 
a survey was selected for collecting data were addressed, stating that a convenience 
sample was the best method given the time constraints. The additional methods of 
piloting and using snowball sampling to increase the number of respondents was also 
                                                 
8 https://www.stata.com/why-use-stata/ 
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addressed. A detailed look at the design of the study was given, breaking the survey 
down into two parts and mentioning who was targeted for the respondent population. 
Finally, a detailed explanation of how the data was to be captured, coded and analysed 
was introduced. A two-sample t test and one-way Anova were selected as the statistical 
tools to carry out the analysis. 
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4 Implementation and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
The object of this survey was to answer the research question, “Are members of 
demographic groups more vulnerable to being exploited by a particular category of 
phishing attack?” The survey collected demographic information and then presented the 
respondents with 15 questions relating to three separate phishing categories. This 
chapter gives a breakdown of the demographic distribution, as well as the noteworthy 
descriptive statistics that were gathered. Finally, the survey results are statistically 
analysed using STATA and it is concluded if there is enough evidence to reject the null 
hypotheses H0. 
4.2 Survey Responses 
 Completion Rates 
In total, 189 responses were collected from the survey. This is double the original target 
sample size, which will give more statistical power to the results. Each question in the 
survey was mandatory which meant that no incomplete answers could be submitted. Due 
to this, the number of unfinished surveys was not tracked.  
 Demographic Distribution 
The first section of the survey collected demographic information of the respondents. A 
breakdown of the participant’s gender can be seen in figure 4-1 below. As demonstrated 
in the graph, there is an evenly balanced sample of respondents from each gender, which 
is pivotal for the study. Gender is one of the most commonly analysed demographics 
when it comes to phishing vulnerability. Due to this, an even distribution will aid the 
statistical analysis and allow the results to be accurately compared against previous 
studies.  
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Figure 4-1: Percentile distribution of gender 
 
A distribution of the age categories is outlined in figure 4-2. Similar to gender, age is 
one of the most commonly analysed demographics in phishing vulnerability studies. The 
chart shows a clear reduction in the number of responses as the age group increases. This 
may be due to the sampling method that was employed which targeted social media to 
acquire participants. 
 
Figure 4-2: Percentile distribution of age groups 
 
 
The results for Education as shown by figure 4-3 indicate a plurality of respondents have 
a Bachelor’s degree or higher diploma. Almost one third of the participants have a 
Master’s degree, while 24% have either none of the defined degrees or a Level 5 
Associate degree. This is valuable information to receive as analysis can be performed 
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to see if having a Level 5 or lower education is detrimental to a person’s vulnerability 
to phishing.   
 
 
Figure 4-3: Percentile distribution of education levels 
 
 
The annual gross income categories as seen in figure 4-4 show a relatively even 
distribution. Due to income being one of the least analysed demographics as outlined in 
Chapter 2.6.3, having a sufficient sample size among each of the categories was 
important. Eleven percent of respondents chose not to disclose their gross income. In the 
context of this study, this information is redundant because no clear results can be drawn 
given that any of the participants may have selected this option. Due to this, the “I don’t 
want to disclose” group results will be disregarded during analysis even if they are below 
our significance level. 
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Figure 4-4: Percentile distribution of annual gross income brackets 
 
 
Finally, the results of the participants occupation is highlighted in figure 4-5. Over sixty 
percent of those surveyed are employed within either the Business and Finance industry 
or the Information Technology industry. Only six percent of the population are students, 
which is lower than initially anticipated. As discussed in chapter 2, students are being 
targeted by phishing attacks on a more regular basis so a large number of responses in 
this category were desired so statistically significant conclusions to be made. This 
uneven distribution may make it difficult to rely on the results of the statistical test, 
which are addressed in more detail in Chapter 4.6.5. 
 
Figure 4-5: Percentile distribution of sectoral occupation/students 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics  
The data presented in this chapter highlights the descriptive statistics of each 
demographic group cross tabulated against total test scores, and their individual category 
test scores. 
 Total Quiz Scores refers to the participants total score for all fifteen questions. 
 Category 1 Scores refers to the participants score for category 1 i.e. Questions 
1-5 relating to email phishing. 
 Category 2 Scores refers to the participants score for category 2 i.e. Questions 
6-10 relating to smishing. 
 Category 3 Scores refers to the participants score for category 3 i.e. Questions 
11-15 relating to content injection. 
Descriptive statistics are used to provide a headline analysis about the data collected. 
They allow initial observations to be made regarding the data, and a chance to see 
potential trends. Once the descriptive statistics have been analysed, inferential statistics 
can be applied in order to draw conclusions and project the findings onto a larger group. 
The mean and sample standard deviation were analysed as they make up the 
fundamentals of data analysis. The mean was selected because the data is consistent 
which will give a reliable answer each time. It is important not to rely on one statistic to 
describe the data, as outliers and skewed distributions may affect the reliability of 
findings. The sample standard deviation was also chosen because it is a commonly used 
measure of variability. Again, if the data has a non-normal distribution or many outliers, 
just using the standard deviation will not display all the information that is needed. 
Marshall & Jonker (2010) states “the standard deviation allows for expressing variance 
using the same units as those used for the observations or measurements”.  
Due to the number of demographic groups and dependant variables, and with brevity in 
mind, only the most significant statistics have been included in this chapter. The full list 
of descriptive statistics are outlined in Appendix 2.  
 Gender 
Gender – Total Scores 
Table 4-1 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their total test 
scores. Males have a slightly higher mean value compared to females. 
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Male Female 
Participants 92 97 
Mean 11.09 10.77 
Sample SD, s 1.59 1.83 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for gender 
 
Age – Total scores 
Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their total test 
scores. The 56 + age group has the lowest mean score, while the 26-35 bracket appears 
to have done the best, given the comparison with their standard deviation. 
 
 
18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 56 + 
Participants 53 52 38 33 13 
Mean 11.03 11.59 10.94 10.21 9.61 
Sample SD, s 1.77 1.50 1.55 1.62 1.59 
 
Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for age 
 
Age – Category 3 scores 
Test scores for the different age groups from category three are displayed in table 4-3 
below. Once again, the 56 + age group have performed the worst when analysing their 
mean value but the 36 – 45 age group have a much lower standard deviation. This 
indicates that the values in the statistical data set are close to the mean of the data set.  
 
 
18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 56 + 
Participants 53 52 38 33 13 
Mean 2.77 3.11 2.34 2.66 2.15 
Sample SD, s 1.05 1.01 0.13 0.87 0.76 
 
Table 4-3: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for age 
 
 Education 
Education – Total scores 
Table 4-4 below shows the descriptive statistics for education compared with their total 
test scores. For the purposes of clarity, the “None of these” category within the 
Education group is referred to as “No Degree” in this chapter. It can be seen that the “No 
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Degree” group has the lowest mean and standard deviation value, indicating a 
correlation between lower education and vulnerability to phishing. 
 
  No 
Degree 
Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Participants 20 24 77 50 18 
Mean 9.75 10.20 11.20 11.14 11.44 
Sample SD, s 1.58 2.18 1.64 2.32 1.90 
 
Table 4-4: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for education 
 
Education – Category 1 scores 
Category one test scores for the education demographic are displayed in table 4-5. It can 
be seen that the “No Degree” and “Level 5” groups perform the worst on average.  
 
  No Degree Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Participants 20 24 77 50 18 
Mean 3.35 3.45 3.88 3.94 3.77 
Sample SD, s 1.03 1.28 0.99 0.91 0.80 
 
Table 4-5: Descriptive statistics for the category 1 test scores for education 
 
 Income 
Income – Total scores 
Table 4-6 below shows the descriptive statistics for income compared with their total 
test scores. There is a relatively large mean test score difference among the €20,000-
30,000 group when compared with the others. 
 
€  0-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k 50-60k 60k +  Not 
Disclosed 
Participants 18 30 43 29 22 26 21 
Mean 11.05 10.40 10.97 11.06 10.86  11.07  11.19  
Sample SD, s 3.11 2.35 1.48 1.53 1.67 1.74 1.47 
 
Table 4-6: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for the income demographic  
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Income – Category 1 scores 
The category one test scores of the income demographic, the 60,000 + group scored best. 
This group’s standard deviation value when compared to the others, also seem to indicate 
a greater spread in the data as seen in Table 4-7. 
 
€  0-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k 50-60k 60k +  Not Disclosed 
Participants 18 30 43 29 22 26 21 
Mean 3.77  3.43 3.86  3.95 3.59  4.00 3.76  
Sample SD, s 1.24 1.25 0.90 0.86 0.95 1.01 0.94 
 
Table 4-7: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for the income demographic 
 
 Occupation/Student 
Occupation/Student – Total scores 
Table 4-8 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation compared with their total test 
scores. The media and healthcare occupations have the best mean scores, with 
agriculture scoring the worst. 
 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 9.0 10.56 10.28 11.23 11.05 10.62 11.60 11.33 
Sample SD, s 2.94 1.73 1.63 4.69 1.30 0.74 1.57 1.92 
 
Table 4-8: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for the occupation/student demographic 
 
Occupation/Student – Category 1 scores 
Test scores for the occupation groups from category 1 are displayed in table 4-9. The 
mean scores are even across all occupations apart from agriculture which performed the 
worst. 
 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 2.75 3.76 3.71 3.88 3.88 3.87 3.50 3.83 
Sample SD, s 2.06 0.99 0.99 1.05 0.90 0.99 0.97 1.26 
 
Table 4-9: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for the occupation/student 
demographic 
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Occupation/Student – Category 3 scores 
Test scores for the different occupation groups from category 3 are displayed in table 4-
10. 
 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 2 2.46 2.07 2.76 3.17 2.50 3.40 2.83 
Sample SD, s 0 0.92 0.82 0.97 0.99 0.75 0.96 1.11 
 
Table 4-10: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for the occupation/student 
demographic 
 
 Additional Analysis 
Additional analysis was performed to identify the breakdown of correct answers per 
question. It is clear from figure 4-6 that question 11 and 15 were the most incorrectly 
answered questions by a large margin. Both phishing attempts required the user to 
analyse the URL of the webpage. Although it is a subtle difference, by doing so they 
would have realised it was a fake site. This confirms the points by Wu, Miller, & 
Garfinkel (2006), stating that “Users fail to continuously check the browser’s security 
indicators, since maintaining security is not the user’s primary goal”. 
 
Figure 4-6: The percentage of correct answers per question in the survey 
 
4.4 Data Clean up 
Once the data collections were complete and the survey was closed, the data was 
manually analysed and cleaned. This was possible due to the relatively small response 
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size and completed in order for it to be used by a statistical program. The data was 
exported to a spreadsheet and the variables were coded so they could be imported into 
STATA. The variables before being coded were qualitative i.e. Gender consisted of 
“Male” and “Female”. In order to facilitate analysis they were given numerical values 
starting with zero and incrementing through the different demographic categories. This 
is done so statistical models can be run across the data, so STATA can understand the 
variables, and models can be run “blind” in order to reduce bias. A breakdown of the 
categories after being coded can be seen in table 4-11 below.  
 
Value Gender Age Education Income Occupation 
0 Female 18-25 None of these None of these Agriculture 
1 Male 26-35 Level 5 0 - 20,000 Bus/Finance 
2  36-45 Level 6 20,000 - 30,000 Education 
3  46-55 Level 7 30,000 - 40,000 Healthcare 
4  56 + Level 8 40,000 - 50,000 IT 
5    50,000 - 60,000 Manufacturing 
6    60,000 + Media 
7     Student 
 
Table 4-11: A breakdown of the demographic categories with coding applied 
 
4.5 Theoretical Approach 
 In inferential statistics, the term ‘null hypothesis’ (H0 ‘H-naught,’ ‘H-null’) denotes that 
there is no relationship (difference) between the population variables in question. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1 and Ha) denotes that a statement between the variables is 
expected to be true. (Kim, 2017) 
The findings in this chapter are displayed using the following statistical information as 
seen in tables 4-12 and 4-13 below. For hypothesis 1, a two-sample t-test is used which 
will analyse the 2-tailed p-value (Pr(|T| > |t|) and also the mean value (contrast) and 
standard error.  
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T-Test   
2-tailed p-value Pr(|T| > |t|) 
(p) 
Mean (contrast) ± standard 
error 
 
Table 4-12: Two sample t-test values, which are to be analysed 
 
The formula for the t-test can be seen in figure 4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7: T-test formula 
 
For the remaining hypotheses, a one-way Anova will be run initially and the results will 
be presented using the F-value and the 2-tailed p-value [Prob > F]. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3.4.3, if the p value is below the significance level (α = .05), a post hoc test will 
be run to get a better understanding of the groups within the demographic set. If a post 
hoc test is run across the data, it is analysed using the mean (contrast) ± standard error 
and the 2-tailed p-value [Prob > |t|] to identify any statistically significant differences 
between the categories. 
One Way Anova Post Hoc Test 
F-value (F) Mean (contrast) ± standard 
error 
2-tailed p-value [Prob > F] 
(p) 
2-tailed p-value [Prob > |t|] 
(p) 
 
Table 4-13: Values for the one-way Anova and post hoc test which are to be analysed 
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
The empirical results are presented in this chapter using the statistical models 
highlighted in Chapter 4.5. The inclusion of asterisks beside values are used to denote 
different significance levels. 
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 ** = 5% 
 *** = 1% 
At the end of each hypothesis sub chapter, there is a breakdown of the four category test 
scores. They highlight the p value, whether the results are statistically significant and 
thus, if we reject the null hypothesis.  
 
 Hypothesis 1  
As specified in Chapter 3.4.2, a two-sample t test was chosen in order the measure 
phishing vulnerability between genders. This statistical test uses the mean value of the 
four dependant variables with the independent variable, gender. The two-sample t test 
was run first using the total quiz scores dependant variable, which was the participant’s 
total score out of all fifteen questions. This was used to give a broader picture of the 
participant’s vulnerability to phishing, before analysing the individual categories as 
well. Participants were broken down by males and females (n = number of participants): 
 Male (n = 92) 
 Female (n = 97) 
The first hypothesis of this study is stated below: 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between males 
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between males 
and females as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
Total Test Scores: 
For total test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference when comparing 
males and females. The results show that females did not have a statistically significant 
vulnerability to being phished (10.77 ± .1868) when compared with males (11.09 ± 
.1665), p = 0.1978. This p value is outside of the defined significance level (α = .05). 
With these results, the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected.  
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Category 1 and 2 Test Scores: 
Similar to total test scores, category one and two test scores did not return a statistically 
significant difference when comparing males and females. The results show that females 
did not have a statistically significant vulnerability to being phished via email (3.86 ± 
.1011) when compared with males (3.68 ± .1081), p = 0.2220. The same result can be 
seen when analysing female’s vulnerability to smishing (4.39 ± .07967) compared with 
males (4.47 ± .6644), p = 0.4080. With these results, the null hypothesis H0 will not be 
rejected for both categories. 
 
Category 3 Test Scores: 
There was a statistically significant difference between the category three test scores 
when comparing gender vulnerability. The results show that females had a statistically 
significant vulnerability to being phished via content spoofing (2.51 ± .0939) when 
compared with males (2.93 ± .1090), p = 0.0039***. Due to this, the null hypothesis H0 
can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be accepted.  
 
The p value for each test score and whether the null hypothesis is rejected can be seen 
in table 4-14.  
 
Gender – Analysis P Value Statistically 
Significant 
Reject H0 
Total Test Scores 0.1978 No No 
Category 1 Scores 0.2220 No No 
Category 2 Scores 0.4080 No No 
Category 3 Scores 0.0039*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
 
Table 4-14: Analysis of results among gender regarding the four test scores 
 
 Hypothesis 2 
For the remainder of the hypotheses, a one-way Anova was conducted to determine 
vulnerability to phishing among the demographics. Similar to the first hypothesis, the 
total quiz scores dependant variable was analysed first. This was used to give a broader 
picture of the participant’s vulnerability to phishing as a whole, before analysing the 
individual test score categories. Participants were classified into five age groups as 
previously mentioned (n = number of participants): 
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 18 – 25 (n = 53) 
 26 – 35 (n = 52) 
 36 – 45 (n = 38) 
 46 – 55 (n = 33) 
 56 + (n = 13) 
The second hypothesis of this study is highlighted below: 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between age 
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between age 
groups as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
Total Test Scores: 
There was a very statistically significant difference between the age categories (p = 
0.0002). Due to the p value registering below the chosen significance value of .05, a post 
hoc test was run to get a better understanding of how the specific groups differed. A 
Tukey post hoc test was used combined with a Pairwise comparison of means with equal 
variances. The Tukey post hoc test revealed that vulnerability to phishing was 
significantly higher in the 56 + age group when compared with several of the other age 
groups as highlighted below in Figure 4-15. 
 
Age Total Statistics P Value  Contrast ± Std. Err. 
56+ vs 18-25 0.045** -1.42 ± .509 
56+ vs 26-35 0.001*** -3.88 ± .510 
46-55 vs 26-35 0.002*** -1.38 ± .366 
 
Table 4-15: Statistically significant results for the age demographic when analysing their total 
test scores 
 
Due to these results, the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis H1 can be accepted.  
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Category 1 Test Score:  
Similar to the total test scores, There was a statistically significant difference between 
the age groups (F = 3.82, p = 0.0052***). A Tukey post hoc test was run in order to 
get a better understanding of the differences between the age groups. Only one group 
was statistically significant from the other, with the 46-55 group being more 
vulnerable when compared against the 36-45 age group as (-.677 ± .235, p = 0.036**). 
Following on from the total test scores, the null hypothesis H0 will be rejected and 
alternative hypothesis H1 will be accepted. 
 
Category 2 Test Scores:   
When analysing the category two test scores for age, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the age groups (F = 3.80, p = 0.0054***). The post hoc test 
revealed that vulnerability to smishing was significantly higher in the 46-55 age group 
compared to the 18-25 age group (-.550 ± .154, p = 0.004***). There was no 
statistically significant difference between any of the other groups. Given these results, 
the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be 
accepted. 
 
Category 3 Test Scores: 
For the category three test scores, there is a statistically significant difference between 
the age groups (F = 4.80, p = 0.0010***).  The post hoc test revealed that vulnerability 
to content spoofing was significantly higher in the 36-45 and 56 + age groups compared 
to the 26-35 age group (-.773 ± .206, p = 0.002***) (-.961 ± .299, p = 0.14) respectively. 
However, there was no statistically significant difference between any of the other 
groups. Due to these results, the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis H1 can be accepted. The p value for each test score and whether the null 
hypothesis is rejected can be seen in table 4-16. 
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Age – Analysis P Value Statistically 
Significant 
Reject H0 
Total Test Scores 0.0002*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
Category 1 Scores 0.0052*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
Category 2 Scores 0.0054*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
Category 3 Scores 0.0010*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
 
Table 4-16: Analysis of results among age regarding the four test scores 
 
 Hypothesis 3 
A one-way Anova was conducted to determine if the education level had an effect on a 
user’s vulnerability to phishing. Participants were classified into five groups as 
previously mentioned (n = number of participants). For the purposes of clarity, the 
“None of these” group is referred to as “No Degree” in this chapter. 
 Level 5 (n = 24) 
 Level 6 (n = 77)  
 Level 7 (n = 50) 
 Level 8 (n = 18)  
 No Degree (n = 20)  
The third hypothesis of this study is highlighted below: 
Hypothesis 3: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between 
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
H1: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between 
education levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
Total Test Scores: 
There was a statistically significant difference between the total test score when 
compared with education levels (F = 4.81, p = 0.0010***). The Tukey post hoc test 
revealed that vulnerability to phishing was significantly higher in the No Degree group 
when compared with Level 6, Level 7 and Level 8 education as seen below. 
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Education Total Statistics P Value  Contrast ± Std. Err. 
No Degree vs Level 6 0.005*** -1.45 ± .417 
No Degree vs Level 7 0.016** -1.39 ± .439 
No Degree vs Level 8 0.017** -1.69 ± .540 
 
Table 4-17: Statistically significant results for the education demographic when analysing their 
total test scores 
 
This indicates that the No Degree group has a negative 1.69 lower mean score than Level 
8 and this result is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level with (p = 0.017). 
It can be seen that the contrast value increases with the level of education when 
compared with the no degree group. This would indicate that the more educated the user 
is, the less vulnerable they are to being phished. Due to these results, the null hypothesis 
H0 can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be accepted. 
 
Category 1 Test Scores: 
For category one test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference when 
comparing them with education levels (F = 2.04, p = 0.0901). No post hoc test was run 
due to the p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results, 
the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected. 
 
Category 2 Test Scores: 
There was not a statistically significant difference when comparing the category two test 
scores with education levels (F = 2.35, p = 0.0561). No post hoc test was run due to the 
p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results, the null 
hypothesis H0 will not be rejected. 
 
Category 3 Test Scores: 
There was a statistically significant difference between the category three test scores 
when compared with education levels (F = 2.43, p = 0.0490*). A post hoc test was run 
but no results were within the 0.05 significance level. Due to this, the null hypothesis H0 
can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 can be accepted. 
 
The p value for each test score and whether the null hypothesis is rejected can be seen 
in table 4-18.  
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Education Analysis P Value Statistically 
Significant 
Reject H0 
Total Test Scores 0.0010*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
Category 1 Scores 0.0901 No No 
Category 2 Scores 0.0561 No No 
Category 3 Scores 0.0490* Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
 
Table 4-18: Analysis of results among education regarding the four test scores 
 
 
 Hypothesis 4 
A one-way Anova was conducted to determine if income level had an effect on a user’s 
vulnerability to phishing. Participants were classified into seven income brackets as 
previously mentioned (n = number of participants). 
 None of these (n = 21) 
 0 - 20,000 (n = 18) 
 20,000 - 30,000 (n = 30) 
 30,000 - 40,000 (n = 43) 
 40,000 - 50,000 (n = 29) 
 50,000 - 60,000 (n = 22) 
 60,000 + (n = 26) 
The fourth hypothesis of this study is highlighted below: 
Hypothesis 4: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between 
income levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
H4: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between income 
levels as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack 
Total Test Scores 
There was not a statistically significant difference between the total test score when 
compared with income levels (F = 0.63, p = 0.7057). Due to the p value registering above 
the significance value of .05, a post hoc test was not run against the data. From the 
results, the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected. 
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Category 1, 2 and 3 Test Scores: 
Similar to the total test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference between 
either the category one, two or three test scores when compared with income levels as 
seen in table 4-19 below. A post hoc test was not run and because of the results, the null 
hypothesis H0 will not be rejected. 
 
Income Analysis F Value  P > F Value 
Cat 1 Scores 1.12 0.3522 
Cat 2 Scores 1.70 0.1229 
Cat 3 Scores 0.31 0.9335 
 
Table 4-19: Category 1, 2 and 3 scores when running a one-way Anova on gross income 
brackets 
 
An overall analysis of the results from the income demographic can be seen in table 4-
20. 
Income – Analysis P Value Statistically 
Significant 
Reject H0 
Total Test Scores 0.7057 No No 
Category 1 Scores 0.3522 No No 
Category 2 Scores 0.1229 No No 
Category 3 Scores 0.9335 No No 
 
Table 4-20: Analysis of results among income regarding the four test scores 
 
 
 Hypothesis 5 
A one-way Anova was conducted to determine if occupation or being a student had an 
effect on a user’s vulnerability to phishing. Participants were classified into eight fields 
as previously mentioned (n = number of participants). 
 Agriculture (n = 4) 
 Business/Finance (n = 73) 
 Education (n = 14) 
 Healthcare (n = 17) 
 Information Technology (n = 51) 
 Manufacturing (n = 8) 
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 Media (n = 10) 
 Student (n = 12) 
The large distributional difference and varying sample sizes between the occupation 
demographics as seen above raises issues when employing a statistical model. Various 
studies highlight the importance of an evenly distributed sample size in order to properly 
infer results (Button et al., 2013).  Button et al., (2013), states, “Low statistical power 
undermines the purpose of scientific research; it reduces the chance of detecting a true 
effect”. Statistical power is affected primarily by the size of the sample used to detect 
it9. Due to this, it will be difficult to rely on these results and generalise them onto a 
larger population. 
The fifth hypothesis of this study is highlighted below: 
Hypothesis 5: 
H0: When given a quiz, there is no difference in the mean test scores between 
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
H5: When given a quiz, there is a difference in the mean test scores between 
occupations or students as to who are more vulnerable to fall for a phishing attack. 
Total Test Scores 
There was a statistically significant difference between the total test score when 
compared with occupation (F = 2.89, p = 0.0069***). With the p value registering below 
the significance value of .05, a post hoc test was run to get a better understanding of how 
the specific groups differed. The Tukey post hoc test revealed that vulnerability to 
phishing was significantly higher in the Business and Finance occupation when 
compared with Information Technology (.9481 ± .305, p = 0.044*). There were no other 
statistically significant results returned from the post hoc test. From these results, the 
null hypothesis H0 will be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H5 will be accepted. 
 
Category 1 Test Scores: 
For category one test scores, there was not a statistically significant difference when 
comparing different occupations (F = 0.81, p = 0.5794). No post hoc test was run due to 
                                                 
9 https://effectsizefaq.com/2010/05/31/what-is-statistical-power/ 
50 
 
the p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results, the 
null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected. 
 
Category 2 Test Scores: 
There was not a statistically significant difference when comparing category two test 
scores with the different occupations (F = 0.85, p = 0.5513). No post hoc test was run 
due to the p value registering higher than the significance level of .05. With these results, 
the null hypothesis H0 will not be rejected. 
 
Category 3 Test Scores: 
There was a statistically significant difference between the category three test scores 
when compared with occupation (F = 4.56, p = 0.0001***). The post hoc test revealed 
that the Business and Finance occupation is more vulnerable to content spoofing when 
compared with Information Technology professionals as seen in table 4-21. This 
coincides with the results from the total test scores. It can also be seen that Education 
professionals were more vulnerable to content spoofing when compared with both 
Information Technology and Media professionals. From these results, the null 
hypothesis H0 will be rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 will be accepted. 
 
Occupation Cat 3 Statistics P Value  Contrast ± Std. Err. 
IT vs Bus/Finance 0.001*** .710 ± .172 
IT vs Education 0.004*** 1.105 ± .285 
Media vs Education 0.019** 1.328 ± .391 
 
Table 4-21: Statistically significant results for the occupation demographic when analysing 
their category 3 test scores 
 
The results obtained from the occupation demographic are highlighted in Table 4-22 
below. 
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Occupation 
Analysis 
P Value Statistically 
Significant 
Reject H0 
Total Test Scores 0.0069*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
Category 1 Scores 0.5794 No No 
Category 2 Scores 0.5513 No No 
Category 3 Scores 0.0001*** Yes Yes (Accept H1) 
 
Table 4-22: Analysis of results among occupation/students regarding the four test scores 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the implementation and results from the statistical analysis. A 
breakdown of the demographic distribution was highlighted, showing how respondents 
were spread between the different groups. The noteworthy descriptive statistics were 
presented, which allowed initial observations to be made before the statistical models 
were run across the data. The method for how the data was cleaned and coded so it could 
be imported into STATA was also introduced. Finally, the theoretical approach was 
undertaken, running the two-sample t-test and one-way Anova models across the results 
of the survey in order to see if there was a statistically significant outcome. From these 
results, each of the five hypotheses were answered. 
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5 Analysis, Evaluation and Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the results obtained in chapter four compared with what is 
already known. Whether the results of this project coincide or refute previous studies 
will be addressed and reasons for these results are discussed.   
 Gender  
Previous research has found mixed results when analysing phishing vulnerability among 
gender (Kumaraguru et al., 2009a; Sheng et al., 2010). Some studies concluded that there 
was no significant difference among gender in the tendency to fall for phishing emails 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009a), while others established women as the more vulnerable 
gender (Sheng et al., 2010). The findings from this study illustrate that there is no 
statistically significant difference between males and females when comparing their 
vulnerability to phishing as a whole or through email and smishing. This indicates that 
neither males nor females are more vulnerable to phishing when analysing the above 
three categories. However, when considering the category 3 scores, women appear to be 
more susceptible to content spoofing when compared to men. These results would 
suggest that females are more vulnerable than males at falling for content spoofing 
phishing attacks. Perhaps this could be contributed to women’s tendency to be more 
trustworthy of web content, as suggested in a study by Gavett et al., (2017). 
 Age 
All of the previous research undertaken appears to highlight that younger adults, mainly 
in the 18-25 age group are the most vulnerable to phishing attacks (Gavett et al., 2017; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2009a; Sheng et al., 2010). From the results obtained in Chapter 
4.6.2, it was concluded that the 56 + age group was the most vulnerable to being phished 
when analysing participants total test scores. This can be seen not only when examining 
the mean and standard deviation values but also when using a post hoc test to compare 
vulnerability between all age groups.  
Following on from this, a consistent pattern emerges when analysing the category one, 
two and three test scores of each age group. It was observed that the 46-55 age group 
was more vulnerable to email phishing when compared with the 36-45 group for 
category one test scores. For category two scores, the 46-55 age group was again more 
vulnerable to being caught out via smishing when compared against the 18-25 age group. 
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Finally, when analysing category three test scores, vulnerability to content spoofing was 
significantly higher in the 36-45 and 56 + age groups compared to the 26-35 age group.  
All of these results appear to indicate that older adults above the age of 36 are more 
vulnerable than younger adults to being phished in all categories that were analysed. 
This goes against the findings from previous work already obtained and may be down 
to a number of factors. Potential explanations for this include that older individuals are 
not as well informed or experienced with technology. Younger adults who grow up with 
a multitude of technology at their fingertips are more likely to be able to identify a 
spoofed phishing request through experience and knowledge. This same concept can be 
thought for smishing vulnerability as many of the younger participants may be more 
experienced with their mobile phones and can identify the phishing attempts easier. 
 Education 
In the limited research that has been carried out to analyse education levels and 
vulnerability to phishing, Dhamija et al., (2006), concluded that there was “no 
significant correlation between education level and scores”. However, when analysis is 
performed on the results of this survey, a different outcome is presented. For total test 
scores, there was a very statistically significant difference when comparing education 
levels. From the results obtained, participants with no degree i.e. those who selected 
“none of these” within the survey were most vulnerable to phishing. In fact, there was a 
direct correlation between low-test scores and no degree when analysing the mean and 
standard deviation as well as running the one-way Anova. Furthermore, vulnerability to 
phishing was significantly higher in the no degree group when compared with those who 
have Level 6, Level 7 and Level 8 education.  
There are a number of potential explanations for these results. Perhaps participants who 
do not have a degree are in the first years of third level education. Those who have 
completed higher-level education potentially have access to greater information 
technology and education resources. There has been no other research into the influence 
of education on vulnerability to phishing. This would suggest a gap in the literature and 
understanding into the relationship between this demographic, and suggests the need for 
further research. 
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 Income 
Previous research suggest that there is no evidence linking a high income with an 
increased vulnerability to being phished (Leukfeldt 2014). The findings from this study 
coincide with previous research, as there were no statistically significant differences 
between income levels and test scores.  
Given these results, phishing is portrayed in a slightly darker, more ruthless light because 
it is deemed that no one is safe. Leukfeldt (2014) stated “An unemployed person on a 
shoestring budget or a director of a multinational company: everyone has an equal 
chance of becoming a victim.”  
 Occupation/Student 
From the previous research that was reviewed, it revealed that students were more prone 
to phishing attacks when compared against working professionals (Metzger, Flanagin, 
& Zwarun 2003; Mohebzada et al., 2012). Mohebzada et al., (2012) concluded, 
“Experience could be a factor in victimising an individual during a social engineering 
attack”. The results from the analysis go against these findings, as there is no statistically 
significant difference between students and any of the occupations when comparing their 
vulnerability to phishing across all categories. Each of the student participants were 
identified as being in the 18-25 age group. With this information, a correlation could be 
suggested with the age demographic results in chapter 5.1.2. The results found younger 
participants less likely to be phished when compared with older adults, which could be 
a result of information technology experience and knowledge.  
It was difficult to locate any peer-reviewed literature that compared and contrasted 
different occupations and their vulnerability to phishing. Due to this, there are no studies 
that can be referenced against the results of this project. For total test scores and category 
three test scores, there was a statistically significant difference when comparing test 
scores and occupation. It transpired that Business and Finance professionals could be 
considered as more vulnerable to being phished when compared with Information 
Technology professionals. These findings suggest that IT professionals are more aware 
of attempted phishing attacks which could be attributed to industry knowledge and 
experience. For category three results, respondents who are in education were also seen 
as more vulnerable to phishing attacks when compared with IT professionals. Education 
professionals were also seen as more vulnerable, when compared with Media 
professionals, to content spoofing attacks.  
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5.2 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the results of the analysis obtained in chapter four and identified 
whether they agreed or contested findings of previous studies. Finally, a discussion on 
why these results were obtained was introduced. 
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6 Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the objectives and limitations of the research, the contributions to 
the body of knowledge and any recommendations for future work that may be 
undertaken.  
6.2 Research Overview and Problem Definition 
The objective of this research project was to answer the following research question: 
Are members of demographic groups more vulnerable to being exploited by a particular 
category of phishing attack? 
The emphasis of the study was focused on three types of phishing, which are currently 
viewed as some of the most prevalent and dangerous. Measuring a user’s vulnerability 
to a specific type of phishing is an important aspect in order to help mitigate against its 
threat. If it is clear who is most vulnerable to a specific type of phishing attack, it is 
possible that more secure methods of anti-phishing training and awareness could be 
introduced to reduce the quantity of successful attacks. 
Quantitative research was performed in order to statistically analyse if particular 
members of a demographic group were more vulnerable to a specific type of phishing. 
The primary data gathered from the survey was analysed using statistical tools in order 
to identify if a statistically significant result was obtained.  
6.3 Limitations of Research 
Undertaking a study of this size can introduce limitations that may potentially halt or 
hinder the research.  
 One of the main limitations experienced during the course of this study was a 
lack of previous research when analysing demographic vulnerability to phishing. 
Although there were a handful of studies that could be used to aid the research, 
the small amount of information affected the discussion when considering results 
against the backdrop of previous literature.  
 
 A limitation encountered when performing the analysis was a lack of cross 
analysis between demographics. The statistical analysis performed looked at 
singular demographics and the members within them but no analysis was 
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undertaken to consider how multiple demographics may affect vulnerability to 
phishing.  
 
 A true random sample would have been helped to increase the likelihood that the 
results will accurately reflect the entire population (Brant, Haas-Haseman, Wei, 
Wickham, & Ponto 2015).  
6.4 Contributions and Impact 
This dissertation focused on identifying differences that exist among five demographics 
to determine which members are the most vulnerable to being exploited by a particular 
type of phishing. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, no study has been undertaken 
to determine what types of phishing are the most successful at exploiting users. The 
results from this study were able to identify which members of a demographic group 
were vulnerable to a specific kind of phishing.  
As previously mentioned, the lack of literature to examine demographic vulnerability 
has limited this study when discussing the results. Therefore, the findings from this study 
are significantly relevant to examining which members of a demographic group are 
vulnerable to phishing. This study is expected to contribute the results, conclusions and 
recommendations to the information security body of knowledge. It is hoped that this 
material will aid future researchers as well as contribute to other studies in this field. 
6.5 Future Work & Recommendations 
There are gaps in the literature to suggest that future work is needed in order to 
continuously monitor user’s vulnerability to new and improved phishing attacks.  
 One area where future research regarding demographic phishing vulnerability 
can benefit from is cross analysis. The use of regression analysis between 
demographics can help to determine what characteristics make users vulnerable. 
In the context of this study, it could be used to determine what combination of 
demographics make a user the most vulnerable e.g. 56 + year old males who 
works in the Business and Finance industry.  
 
 In light of these results, another potential area of future work is to use these 
findings in order to develop innovative ways to help stop phishing attacks. This 
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study highlights who is at risk but a deeper study is required in order to leverage 
these findings and come up with innovative ways to mitigate phishing attacks. 
6.6 Final Thoughts 
The results from this study clearly highlight that phishing is still as deceitful and 
dangerous as ever; with the average total test score being 72%. Although this may seem 
like a good score in academic terms, it only takes one phishing fraud to potentially cause 
massive harm to a victim both financially and emotionally. It is important that studies 
like these continue to be undertaken so consistent and up to date information can be 
gathered. The results obtained from additional studies can be used to inform anti-
phishing work groups, educate people about the dangers of phishing and help mitigate 
against future attacks.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Survey Questions 
Section 1 – Demographic Information 
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Section 2 – Phishing Questions 
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Appendix B - Descriptive Statistics 
Gender 
Gender – Total Scores 
Table B-1 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their total test 
scores. 
 
Male Female 
Total Quiz Scores 1021 1045 
Participants 92 97 
Mean 11.09 10.77 
Sample SD, s 1.59 1.83 
 
Table B-1: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for gender 
 
Gender – Category 1 Scores 
Table B-2 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their category 
one test scores. 
 
Male Female 
Category 1 Scores 339 375 
Participants 92 97 
Mean 3.68 3.86 
Sample SD, s 1.03 0.99 
 
Table B-2: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for gender 
 
Gender – Category 2 Scores 
Table B-3 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their category 
two test scores. 
 
Male Female 
Category 2 Scores 412 426 
Participants 92 97 
Mean 4.47 4.39 
Sample SD, s 0.63 0.78 
 
Table B-3: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for gender 
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Gender – Category 3 Scores 
Table B-4 shows the descriptive statistics for gender cross tabulated with their category 
three test scores. 
 
Male Female 
Category 3 Scores 270 244 
Participants 92 97 
Mean 2.93 2.51 
Sample SD, s 1.04 0.92 
 
Table B-4: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for genders 
 
Age 
Age – Total scores 
Table B-5 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their total test 
scores. 
 
18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 56 + 
Total Quiz Scores 585 603 416 337 125 
Participants 53 52 38 33 13 
Mean 11.03 11.59 10.94 10.21 9.61 
Sample SD, s 1.77 1.50 1.55 1.62 1.59 
 
Table B-5: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for age 
 
Age – Category 1 scores 
Table B-6 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their category 1 
test scores. 
 
18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 56 + 
Category 1 Scores 192 208 157 114 43 
Participants 53 52 38 33 13 
Mean 3.62 4 4.13 3.45 3.30 
Sample SD, s 1.10 0.89 0.86 1.01 0.91 
 
Table B-6: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for age 
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Age – Category 2 scores 
Table B-7 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their category 2 
test scores. 
 
18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 56 + 
Category 2 Scores 246 233 170 135 54 
Participants 53 52 38 33 13 
Mean 4.64 4.48 4.47 4.09 4.15 
Sample SD, s 0.55 0.69 0.59 0.89 0.76 
 
Table B- 7: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for age 
 
Age – Category 3 scores 
Table B-7 shows the descriptive statistics for age cross tabulated with their category 3 
test scores. 
 
18 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 55 56 + 
Category 3 Scores 147 162 89 88 28 
Participants 53 52 38 33 13 
Mean 2.77 3.11 2.3 2.66 2.15 
Sample SD, s 1.05 1.01 0.13 0.87 0.76 
 
Table B- 8: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for age 
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Education 
Education – Total scores 
Table B-9 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their total 
test scores. 
  Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 No Degree 
Total Quiz Scores 245 863 557 206 195 
Participants 24 77 50 18 20 
Mean 10.20 11.20 11.14 11.44 9.75 
Sample SD, s 2.18 1.64 2.32 1.90 1.58 
 
Table B- 9: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for education 
 
Education – Category 1 scores 
Table B-10 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their 
category 1 test scores. 
  Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 No Degree 
Category 1 Scores 83 299 197 68 67 
Participants 24 77 50 18 20 
Mean 3.45 3.88 3.94 3.77 3.35 
Sample SD, s 1.28 0.99 0.91 0.80 1.03 
 
Table B- 10: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for education 
 
Education – Category 2 scores 
Table B-11 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their 
category 2 test scores. 
  Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 No Degree 
Category 2 Scores 107 345 220 85 81 
Participants 24 77 50 18 20 
Mean 4.45 4.48 4.4 4.72 4.05 
Sample SD, s 0.5 0.6 0.728 0.46 0.88 
 
Table B- 11: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for education 
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Education – Category 3 scores 
Table B-12 shows the descriptive statistics for education cross tabulated with their 
category 3 test scores. 
  Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 No Degree 
Category 3 Scores 55 219 140 53 47 
Participants 24 77 50 18 20 
Mean 2.29 2.84 2.8 2.94 2.35 
Sample SD, s 1.04 0.87 1.06 1.05 0.87 
 
Table B- 12: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for education 
 
Income 
Income – Total scores 
Table B-13 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their total 
test scores. 
  0-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k 50-60k 60k +  Not 
Disclosed 
Total Quiz 
Scores 
199 312 472  321  239  288  235  
Participants 18 30 43 29 22 26 21 
Mean 11.05 10.4 10.97 11.89 10.86  11.076 11.190 
Sample SD, s 3.11 2.35 1.48 1.53 1.67 1.74 1.47 
 
Table B- 13: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for income 
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Income – Category 1 scores 
Table B-14 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their category 
1 test scores. 
  0-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k 50-60k 60k +  Not 
Disclosed 
Category 1 
Scores 
68 103  166  115  79  104  79  
Participants 18 30 43 29 22 26 21 
Mean 3.77  3.43 3.86  3.96 3.59  4  3.761 
Sample SD, s 1.24 1.25 0.9 0.86 0.95 1.01 0.94 
 
Table B- 14: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for income 
 
Income – Category 2 scores 
Table B-15 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their category 
2 test scores. 
  0-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k 50-60k 60k +  Not 
Disclosed 
Category 2 
Scores 
86 130  185  129  99  111  98  
Participants 18 30 43 29 22 26 21 
Mean 4.77 4.333 4.302 4.44 4.5  4.26  4.66 
Sample SD, s 0.42 0.42 0.74 0.63 0.80 0.82 0.57 
 
Table B- 15: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for income 
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Income – Category 3 scores 
Table B-16 shows the descriptive statistics for income cross tabulated with their category 
3 test scores. 
  0-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k 50-60k 60k +  Not Disclosed 
Category 3 Scores 45 79  121  77  61  73  58  
Participants 18 30 43 29 22 26 21 
Mean 2.5 2.63  2.81  2.65  2.77  2.80  2.7 
Sample SD, s 0.92 1.15 0.90 0.81 1.03 1.05 1.26 
 
Table B- 16: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for income 
 
Occupation/Student 
Occupation/Student – Total scores 
Table B-17 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their total 
test scores. 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Total Quiz Scores 36 771 144 191 587 85 116 136 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 9 10.56 10.28 11.23 11.0 10.6 11.6 11.33 
Sample SD, s 2.94 1.73 1.63 4.69 1.30 0.74 1.57 1.92 
 
Table B- 17: Descriptive statistics of the total test scores for occupation 
 
Occupation/Student – Category 1 scores 
Table B-18 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their 
category 1 test scores. 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Category 1 Scores 11 275 52 66 198 31 35 46 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 2.75 3.76 3.71 3.88 3.88 3.87 3.5 3.83 
Sample SD, s 2.06 0.99 0.99 1.05 0.90 0.99 0.97 1.26 
 
Table B- 18: Descriptive statistics of the category 1 test scores for occupation 
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Occupation/Student – Category 2 scores 
Table B-19 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their 
category 2 test scores. 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Category 1 Scores 17 316 63 78 227 34 47 56 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 4.0 4.32 4.5 4.58 4.45 4.25 4.7 4.66 
Sample SD, s 0.95 0.8 0.65 0.79 0.6 0.70 0.48 0.49 
 
Table B- 19: Descriptive statistics of the category 2 test scores for occupation 
 
Occupation/Student – Category 3 scores 
Table B-20 shows the descriptive statistics for occupation cross tabulated with their 
category 3 test scores. 
  Agri Bus Edu Health IT Manu  Media Student 
Category 1 Scores 8 180 29 47 162 20 34 34 
Participants 4 73 14 17 51 8 10 12 
Mean 2 2.46 2.07 2.76 3.17 2.5 3.4 2.83 
Sample SD, s 0 0.92 0.82 0.97 0.99 0.75 0.96 1.11 
 
Table B- 20: Descriptive statistics of the category 3 test scores for occupation 
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